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Shaffer: Second Class for the Second Time: How the Commercial Speech Doctr
THE IMPACT OF MEDICAID REFORMS & FALSE CLAIMS
ENFORCEMENT: LIMITING ACCESS BY DISCOURAGING PROVIDER
PARTICIPATION IN MEDICAID PROGRAMS

1.

INTRODUCTION

Approximately 42.5 million people depend on state Medicaid programs to
provide payment for some or all of their health care services.' State Medicaid
reform efforts and false claims enforcement aimed at controlling costs may limit
beneficiaries' access to health care; by increasing the exposure of health care
providers2 to false claims liability, states may inadvertently cause the number of
health care providers who are unwilling to accept Medicaid patients to increase.
Failure to mitigate these burdens probably will result in the realization of the
"very real threat that when a state cracks down too aggressively,
providers many of whom are underpaid anyhow will quit the Medicaid
program.'
,,3

In response to climbing health care costs, state and federal Medicaid reform
efforts have intensified. Federal law now provides states with a number of
options in structuring Medicaid programs. As a result, the structures of Medicaid
programs have become increasingly complex; states' traditional administration
of these programs by a single agency or contracted entity has given way to
decentralized structures dominated by managed care organizations and private
health plans.
The increasing complexity of Medicaid structures places additional burdens
upon providers. Providers must comply with a variety of documentation,
reporting, and reimbursement guidelines imposed by Medicaid agencies as well
as Medicaid-contracted health plan administrators. Additionally, in light of
reformers' intense focus on fraud and abuse by Medicaid providers, the
complexity of the Medicaid structure may subject providers to a greater
likelihood of false claims allegations for failure to adhere to regulations and
guidelines. Given the already declining number of providers participating in
Medicaid, the procedural requirements, combined with the potential liability

1.See EILEEN R. ELLIS ET AL.,

KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,MEDICAID

50 STATES: JUNE 2005 DATA UPDATE
1 (2006),
http://www.kfftorg/medicaid/upload/7606.pdf.
2. In this Note, the term "provider" is used generally to refer to physicians. other health care
practitioners (e.g.. nurse practitioners), and health care institutions (e.g.. hospitals).
3. Misha Segal, Bleeding Dollars: Stanching the Flow of Aisuse and Abuse Confronts a Hard
Reality., in SPECIAL REPORT ON MEDICAID: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN CARE AND COST A20, A21
(2006). http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/medicaid.pdf
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under state and federal false claims acts, may result in an exodus of providers
from the Medicaid program.
This Note examines the potential decrease in Medicaid beneficiaries' access
to care resulting from the combination of Medicaid reform measures and false
claims enforcement. Part 11 provides an overview of state and federal reform
measures designed to reduce Medicaid costs. The discussion includes a general
overview of the Medicaid program and recently enacted federal legislation that
increases the options available for structuring state programs and provides
incentives to states for false claims enforcement. The overview also presents
South Carolina's recent Medicaid reform measures and proposed false claims
act.4
Part ITT analyzes the factors affecting Medicaid provider participation and
the impact of false claims enforcement on participation. This part describes the
implications of federal false claims enforcement in order to demonstrate the
potential impact of substantially similar state false claims statutes. Because of
the complexity of requirements governing providers participating in Medicaid
programs, states' false claims enforcement efforts may contribute to the already
declining number of providers accepting Medicaid patients.
Part IV suggests several measures for counteracting the potential decrease in
Medicaid provider participation due to increased enforcement of state false
claims laws. These measures include requiring health plans to disclose billing
and reimbursement guidelines to health care providers, creating an ombudsman
office within state Medicaid agencies to clarify program requirements, and
providing an affirmative defense to providers who, in good faith, rely upon the
guidance of Medicaid agencies and health plans. Part V briefly concludes.
II.

MEDICAID REFORM

Established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid program
provides payment for medical assistance for specified categories of people who5
lack sufficient income to obtain medically necessary health care services.
Federal law mandates Medicaid coverage for certain categories of people and
allows states the option of providing coverage for other categories. State and
federal funds finance these benefits under state Medicaid programs.
In 2007, the total cost for health care in the United States is projected to
exceed two trillion dollars.8 Combined state and federal Medicaid costs

4. Whether South Carolina's Medicaid reform measures will improve the quality of care or reduce
costs is beyond the scope of this Note.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). For a more extensive discussion of
mandated and optional Medicaid categories and benefits, see BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW
§§ 12-2 to -7 (2d ed. 2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2000); see also infra note 34.
8. OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH& HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH CARE
EXPENDITURES PROJECTIONS:

2005 2015 tbl.l (2005) (on file with author).
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constitute 13.9% of total projected health care costs. 9 After peaking at a growth
rate of 11.8% in 2001, growth in Medicaid spending has slowed each year and is
projected to drop to 1.5% in 2006.10 The decline in Medicaid spending growth is
based primarily upon state Medicaid cost containment efforts. l
Managed care provides states with one method for Medicaid cost
containment. "Managed care is a broad term that describes a variety of health
care delivery system models that integrate the financing and delivery of health
care within a system that seeks to manage the accessibility, cost, and quality of
that care.' 12 Many managed care organizations (MCOs) contain costs by
practices such as capitation, in which the MCO limits the amount of health care
provided to patients and reimbursement paid to providers by paying providers a
flat fee per patient for a given time period. 13 In general, states may require
mandatory managed care enrollment for most categories of Medicaid
beneficiaries so long as, among other requirements, the beneficiaries are able to
choose from at least two managed care entities. 4 Currently, more than 63% of
Medicaid beneficiaries nationally are enrolled in a managed care plan.>1

9. Id.at tbl.3.
10. Id. Despite declines in both the national Medicaid annual growth rate and South Carolina's
total health care expenditure growth rate, South Carolina Medicaid's annual growth rate has increased
steadily since 2002. OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, U.S. DEP T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH
EXPENDITURES
BY
STATE
OF
PROVIDER:
STATE-SPECIFIC TABLES,
1980 2004 (2006),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/nhestatespecific2004.pdf
National
Medicaid annual growth rates in personal health care expenditures for 2002, 2003, and 2004 were 10.4,
8.6, and 8.2%, respectively, and South Carolina total annual growth rates for the same years were 8.4,
7.9, and 7.7%,respectively. Id.By contrast. South Carolina Medicaid annual growth rates were 7.4, 8.8.
and 9.0%. respectively. Id.
11.See OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 8.
Following the expected implementation of state cost containment efforts, the average projected
Medicaid growth rate for 2007 to 2015 is 8.6%. See id. at tbl.3.
12. THOMAS C. FOX ET AL., HEALTH CARE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS MANUAL § 11:2 (2006)
(citation omitted), availableat Westlaw Health Care Fin. Transactions Man. § 11:2; see also COLLEEN
M. FLOOD, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

56 (2003) ("In general terms, managed care covers a variety of techniques whereby insurer/purchasers
(be they public or private) seek to make health care providers sensitive to the costs and benefits of the
services they supply or recommend to their patients.").
13. See generally LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 624-26 (3d ed.
2005) (discussing the theories behind managed care and identifying several types of MCOs). In contrast
to capitation, in a fee-for-service system providers receive payment for each service provided. Id. at
623 24.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(1)(A), (3)(A) (2000). A state may not require Medicaid beneficiaries
who are categorized as children with special needs. Medicare beneficiaries, or American Indians to
enroll in managed care as a condition of receiving benefits. Id. at (a)(2).
15. FINANCE, SYSTEMS & BUDGET GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID
MANAGED
CARE
ENROLLMENT
AS
OF
DECEMBER
31,
2005 (2006),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidDataSourcesGenlnfo/Downloads/mmcpr05.pdf.
Medicaid
beneficiaries in forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico receive managed care. Id.
Managed care has not penetrated the Medicaid programs in Alaska, Wyoming, or the Virgin Islands.
Id.Approximately 14% of the more than 800,000 Medicaid beneficiaries in South Carolina receive
managed health care. Id.
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To further promote state innovation in the containment of Medicaid costs,
Congress enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 200516 (DRA). The DRA
provides states with increased flexibility in structuring Medicaid programs.
Specifically, states may increase cost-sharing and premium requirements for
certain groups of Medicaid beneficiaries 7 and provide alternative benefit
packages with reduced benefits to limited categories of beneficiaries. 1" In
addition, the DRA enables the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) to permit payments to states for methods that increase
the efficiency and effectiveness of providing medical assistance' 9 and to
authorize ten
states to operate health opportunity account (HOA) demonstration
20
programs.
Following passage of the DRA, South Carolina's governor announced that
the state would proceed with most of its plan for Medicaid reform. 21 The South
Carolina Medicaid reform plan, Healthy Connections, offers five methods for
providing medical assistance to qualified beneficiaries: pre-paid plans, primary
care case management plans (PCCMs), an option-out program, health
opportunity accounts, and traditional fee-for-service.22 Healthy Connections

16. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4. 4 (2006).
17.42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (2006) (enacted as Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171,
tit. VI(A), ch. 4, sec. 6041, 120 Stat. 4, 81 85 (2006)).
18. § 1396u-7.
19. § 1396b(z)(1).
20. § 1396u-8. Generally, HOAs are "cash accounts for Medicaid enrollees that can be used to pay
for medical expenses in order to meet the out-of-pocket costs associated with high deductible insurance
plans. The insurance plans offered to Medicaid enrollees who volunteer to participate in the
demonstrations will encompass all standard state Medicaid benefits." Press Release. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., CMS Solicits State Applications for Medicaid Health Opportunity Account
Demonstrations (Jan. 10, 2007), http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/2007pres/200701 10.html. In
January of 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) began soliciting applications
from states for the operation of HOA programs. Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Director. Centers for
Medicaid and State Operations, to State Medicaid Directors (Jan. 10, 2007),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/downloads/SMD0I 1007.pdf.
21. South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford, Recent News: Medicaid Reform Proposal to Be
Implemented: Congressional Budget Bill Would Allow Most of 'SC Healthy Connections' to Go in
Place Without Waiver (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.scgovernor.com/interior.asp?sitecontentid
=7&newsid=707.
22. S.C. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SOUTH CAROLINA HEALTHY CONNECTIONS:
MEDICAID
TRANSFORMATION
PLAN 21-27 (2006),
http://www.dhhs.state.sc.us/
internet/pdf/SouthCarolinaHealthyConnectionsSeptember6 2006.pdfl First, the prepaid health plan
option allows beneficiaries to choose a managed care organization that is contracted with Medicaid and
use their personal health accounts (PHAs) to pay the health plan premiums. Id. at 21-22. The second
plan option, PCCM, requires beneficiaries to select a primary care physician. who will initially receive
payment on a fee-for-service basis, to act as a "gatekeeper' to other services. Id. at 23. Under the
option-out program, Medicaid beneficiaries are not considered traditional beneficiaries, but instead use
their PHAs to pay for employer group health insurance. Id. at 24. Next, the health opportunity plan pilot
allows beneficiaries to become consumers and purchase services directly from health care providers
under traditional Medicaid fee schedules using their PHAs. Id. at 26. Finally, the categories of
beneficiaries identified by Congress as exempt from managed care enrollment requirements, see supra
note 14. will be required to remain in the traditional fee-for-service Medicaid program. S.C. DEP'T OF
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promotes quality health care primarily by increasing health care competition and
beneficiary cost accountability.23
In addition to Medicaid reform plans, federal and state efforts to intensify
the focus on Medicaid fraud and abuse aim to reduce the costs of providing
medical assistance. Traditionally, fraud and abuse efforts focused
disproportionately on Medicare providers 24 ; however, recent recognition of a
significant likelihood of Medicaid fraud and abuse provided the stimulus for
shifting focus to Medicaid providers.25
The most powerful weapon in the federal government's arsenal of fraud and
abuse weapons is the civil False Claims Act (FCA). 26 Liability under the FCA
extends to "[a]ny person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to
an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the
Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
28
approval. ', 27 Violation of the FCA is subject to $5,500 to $11,000 in penalties

HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.. supra, at 27.
23. S.C. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.. supra note 22, at 4. South Carolina's original 1115
waiver proposal serves as the foundation for Healthy Connections. See S.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SOUTH CAROLINA HEALTHY CONNECTIONS, AN 1115 WAIVER PROPOSAL 5 7 (2005),

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGl/MWDL/list.asp (follow "South Carolina
Health Connections 1115" hyperlink; download "South Carolina Health Connections 1115"; then open
the file "South Carolina Healthy Connections Proposal"). For criticisms of the proposal's premises, see
JUDITH SOLOMON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STILL RISIY BUSINESS: SOUTH CAROLINA'S

REVISED MEDICAID WAIVER PROPOSAL 5-10 (2006). http://www.cbpp.org/1-1 1-06health.pdf.
24. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-855T. MEDICAID FRAUD & ABUSE:
CMS'S COMMITMENT TO HELPING STATES SAFEGUARD PROGRAM DOLLARS Is LIMITED 6 9 (2005)

(concluding that, unlike CMS' oversight of Medicare fraud and abuse activities, CMS failed to allocate
adequate resources to support states' Medicaid fraud and abuse efforts); see also ANDY SCHNEIDER,
TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, REDUCING MEDICAID FRAUD: THE POTENTIAL OF THE FALSE CLAIMS
ACT 35 (2003), http://www.taf.org/publications/PDF/reducingmedicaidfraud.pdf(discussing the greater

number of settlements and larger recoveries in Medicare false claims cases as compared to Medicaid
false claims cases).
25. Due to the size, growth, diversity, and open-ended federal funding of the Medicaid program,
in 2003 the GAO added Medicaid to its list of programs at high risk for waste and exploitation. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-101, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES & PROGRAM RISKS:
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 23-26 (2003). One of the key problem areas identified
by the GAO included insufficient oversight of state efforts in identifying inaccurate Medicaid payments
and Medicaid fraud and abuse. Id. at 26, 31 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-300,
MEDICAID FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: BETTER OVERSIGHT OF STATE CLAIMS FOR FEDERAL
REIMBURSEMENTNEEDED 12 (2002); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-662, MEDICAID: STATE
EFFORTS TO CONTROL IMPROPER PAYMENTS VARY 28-29 (2001)).
26.31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 3733 (2000); see JACK A. MEYER & STEPHANIE E. ANTHONY, TAXPAYERS
AGAINST FRAUD, REDUCING HEALTH CARE FRAUD: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT 24, 92 (2001), http://www.taf org/publications/PDF/reducing.pdf.

27. § 3729(a). Liability under the FCA also extends to other acts involving the payment of false
or fraudulent claims, such as creating false records or statements and conspiring to defraud the
government. § 3729(a)(2)-(7). For a historical overview of the FCA, see MEYER & ANTHONY, supra
note 26, at 26-31.
28. § 3729(a). In response to the Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, the Department of Justice
changed the civil penalties regulations to allow the minimum penalty for violations of the FCA to rise
from $5.000 to $5,500 and the maximum penalty from $10.000 to $11,000. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3 (2006).
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for each false claim2 9 and double or treble damages.30 Since 1986, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has recovered $15 billion from fraud and false
claims settlements and judgments.3 In fiscal year 2005, recoveries for health
care fraud and false claims, primarily related to Medicare and
Medicaid,
32
constituted $1.1 billion of the total $1.4 billion recovered that year.
To reduce fraud and abuse associated with the Medicaid program, 33 the
DRA supplies a new incentive for states to enact false claims legislation. The
DRA allows a state to recover an additional 10% of the state's share for
recoveries received pursuant to a state law that prohibits the submission of false
or fraudulent claims to the state's Medicaid program.34 To qualify for the
increased share of recovery, a state's law must meet several requirements:
(1) [E]stablish[] liability to the State for false or fraudulent
claims described in [the FCA] with respect to [Medicaid

29. A claim includes "any request or demand [for payment]... if the United States Government
provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government
will reimburse ... any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded." 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(c). Penalties are assessed based on the number of requests or demands for payment and not the
individual items or services listed in each claim. See United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 938-40
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting the government's argument that each code on a claim form constituted a
separate false claim and remanding for recalculation of civil penalties based on the number of requests
for payments, e.g., the number of claim forms submitted).
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
31. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $1.4 Billion in Fraud & False
Claims in Fiscal Year 2005; More Than $15 Billion Since 1986 (Nov. 7, 2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/November/05 civ 595.html. In additionto the DOJ, many state and
federal agencies conduct investigations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud. ALICE G. GOSFIELD,
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE §§ 6.1-6.10 (2006), available at MEDFRAUD
(Westlaw) (identifying and discussing the roles of various entities in investigating Medicare and
Medicaid fraud and abuse); see also AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, FRAUD AND ABUSE: Do CURRENT
LAWS PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 14-15 (1999). available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/
Content/ContentGroups/Public Interest2/Colloquiums and Reports 1/pi fa colloq99.PDF (describing
regulation of fraud and abuse of the healthcare system by various government and private entities).
32. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 31.
33. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that enactment of state false claims acts will reduce
Medicaid spending by $334 million from fiscal year 2006 to 2015. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG.,
COST ESTIMATE, S. 1932 DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, at 36 (2006).
34.42 U.S.C.A. § 1396h(a) (2006). Because of the joint federal and state funding of the Medicaid
program. states share with the federal government in Medicaid false and fraudulent claims recoveries.
Publication of OIG's Guidelines for Evaluating State False Claims Acts, 71 Fed. Reg. 48,552, 48,552
(Aug. 21, 2006). Based on a state's per capita income, the federal medical assistance percentage
(FMAP) determines the amount of federal funds a state receives for its Medicaid program. Id. Likewise.
the FMAP determines the division of state and federal recoveries. Id. at 48,553. For example, the FMAP
for South Carolina is 69.54%. Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures, 70 Fed.
Reg. 71,856, 71,857 (Nov. 30, 2005). Absent a state law meeting the provisions of the DRA, South
Carolina would be entitled to 30.46% of Medicaid damages resulting from state actions recovered under
the federal FCA, and the federal government would be entitled to 69.54% of Medicaid damage
recoveries. See Publication of OG's Guidelines for Evaluating State False Claims Acts, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 48,553. Under a state false claims act meeting the DRA provisions, the state's portion of the recovery
would equal 40.46% of the total recovery. See id.
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expenditures] ....(2) [C]ontain[] provisions that are at least as
effective in rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions for false
or fraudulent claims as those described in [the FCA]. (3)
[C]ontain[] a requirement for filing an action under seal for 60
days with review by the State Attorney General. [and] (4)
[C]ontain[] a civil penalty that is not less than the amount of
the civil penalty authorized under [the FCA].35
If a state's false claims statute "meets the enumerated requirements on or after
January 1, 2007, and the recovery from the action brought under the qualifying
law is received by the State on or after January 1, 2007, the State will qualify for
a 10 percent increase in its share of the amount recovered. 36
Many states enacted false claims statutes prior to the passage of the DRA. 3
In response to the DRA's financial incentive, seventeen states,38 including South
Carolina,39 introduced false claims bills. The federal Office of the Inspector
General (OIG), in consultation with the Attorney General, determines whether a
false claims statute meets the requirements of the DRA.4 °
Thus, after enactment of the DRA, two additional policies encourage states
to fight the rising costs of Medicaid: flexibility in structuring the Medicaid
program and increased incentives to enact and enforce state false claims statutes.
In an effort to combat Medicaid costs and increase quality, South Carolina has
implemented a reform plan that provides a variety of options for care to

35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396h(b). With respect to penalties, in determining whether a state's false
claims law meets the requirements of the DRA, the OIG will only consider whether the false claims law
contains penalty amounts that at least equal the statutory penalties of the FCA. Publication of OIG's
Guidelines for Evaluating State False Claims Acts, 71 Fed. Reg. at 48,554 & n.2 (publishing the OIG's
guidelines for determining whether a state law meets the requirements set forth in the DRA).
36. Publication of O1G's Guidelines for Evaluating State False Claims Acts, 71 Fed. Reg. at
48,553.
37. FraudandAbuse:Growth In State False Claims Laws CouldAffect Settlements, Attorneys Say,
[2006] HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (BNA) (June 19, 2006) (noting that false claims laws in the
District of Columbia, California, Delaware. Florida. Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana. Louisiana. Massachusetts.
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia predated
the DRA). In addition to the states identified, South Carolina also had a Medicaid false claims statute
existing prior to the enactment of the DRA. Generally, South Carolina's current Medicaid false claims
law prohibits the knowing and willful submission of a false claim to Medicaid. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-760(B) (Supp. 2006). On top of imprisonment and fines for each false claim, the law permits the Attorney
General to bring an action to recover treble damages and permits the court to impose civil penalties of
$2.000 per false claim. § 43-7-60(D), (E).
38. FraudandAbuse: Growth in State FalseClaims Laws CouldAffect Settlements, Attorneys Say.
supra note 37.
39. S.B. 0082, 117th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2007). The bill, as filed, contains a qui tam
provision. Id.
40. Publication of O1G's Guidelines for Evaluating State False Claims Acts, 71 Fed. Reg. at
48,553. For the OIG's review of specific state false claims laws, see Specific State Laws Reviewed by
OIG, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/falseclaimsact.html# I (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). For a discussion of the
O1G's review procedure. see infra note 102.
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Medicaid beneficiaries. Efforts are also being made to enact a false claims
statute in order to further reduce costs and combat Medicaid fraud and abuse.4
111. SHIFTING BURDENS TO MEDICAID PROVIDERS

Despite the laudable aims of South Carolina's Healthy Connections plan, a
resulting decrease in Medicaid beneficiaries' access to care may mitigate the
projected increase in quality of care. The growing structural complexity of
Medicaid combined with contemporaneous federal and state efforts to intensify
the focus on Medicaid false claims may discourage provider participation in the
Medicaid program.
This part analyzes the factors affecting the declining rate of Medicaid
provider participation and the potential impact of false claims enforcement. The
discussion focuses on concerns and implications of the federal False Claims Act
(FCA) because the DRA requires that state statutes contain specific elements
that are also present in the federal statute in order for a state to qualify for an
increased share of recovery.
A.

ProviderParticipationin the Medicaid Program

Historically, concerns regarding Medicaid provider participation42 focused
predominantly on low Medicaid reimbursement rates.43 These concerns continue

41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42. In the context of this Note, a "Medicaid-participating provider" refers to a provider who, "with
respect to an individual enrolled in a fee-for-service program .... has entered into a participation
agreement with the State for the provision of services to individuals entitled to benefits under the State
plan, or with respect to an individual enrolled in an MCO [managed care organization] ....
has entered
into an arrangement for the provision of services to enrollees of the organization under Medicaid."
Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations, to State Medicaid
Directors, supra note 20, at 3.
43. In a 1990 1993 study, researchers sought to identify factors affecting full or limited
participation in the Medicaid program. Janet D. Perloff et al.. Which PhysiciansLimit Their Medicaid
Participation,and Why. HEALTH SERVS. REs., April 1995, at 7. 8. The study focused on the effects of
Medicaid reimbursement rates on providers' decisions to participate in the Medicaid program. Id.The
results indicated that although higher Medicaid rates were associated with higher rates of full
participation, to effect a significant change in Medicaid participation the Medicaid rates would have to
increase an estimated 60%. Id. at 22. Regarding Medicaid managed care, the results indicated
difficulties in increasing participation where the state refused to allow setting capitation rates above
Medicare rates. Id. at 22 23. In addition, the researchers noted the flexibility afforded to providers
under a fee-for-service system and that the payment of capitated fees by a managed care organization
may adversely impact provider participation:
Historically, the fee-for-service system permitted providers to modulate their
involvement with Medicaid in response to changing conditions such as rising
practice costs, changes in payment level, and changes in demand. While this
flexibility may limit access, it also preserves access by permitting continued
involvement in the program at a level that is at the physician's discretion.
Medicaid managed care contracts that require "fixed" participation-either by
requiring that physicians participate fully, or by requiring that they accept a
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to present a major deterrent to Medicaid provider participation. In 2004 2005,
the number of physicians reporting that they would accept no new Medicaid
patients increased to 21% from 19.4% in 1996-1997. 44 Despite increases in

Medicaid payment rates and beneficiary enrollment,45 84% of providers refusing
to accept new Medicaid patients cited low Medicaid reimbursement rates as a
moderate or very important reason for limiting acceptance of Medicaid
patients.46 Typically, physicians refusing to accept new Medicaid patients are
physicians who practice solo, in small groups, or metropolitan areas; receive
from 1% to 9% of total revenue from Medicaid; and specialize in general
internal medicine, family practice, and surgery.47
Another major factor, more recently emphasized, contributing to a decline in
Medicaid provider participation is the difficulty in billing and receiving
reimbursement from Medicaid and Medicaid-contracted plans. In 2004 2005,
approximately 70% of physicians cited billing difficulties and paperwork
requirements as reasons for not accepting new Medicaid patients, 48 and

predetermined number of patients may limit this flexibility. This loss of
flexibility may discourage physicians from entering into managed care
arrangements. making implementation of these arrangements more difficult and
leading to unintended reductions in access as physicians formerly available to at
least some Medicaid eligibles decline any involvement with the programs. The
consequences of requiring fixed participation in Medicaid managed care are not
well understood, and the effects of such consequences on access to care should
be examined closely in states enrolling Medicaid eligibles into managed care.
Id. at 23; see also Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation:Patients, Poverty, and
Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 194 202 (1995) (discussing the impact of low
payment rates on provider participation and suggesting that states seek other "financial incentives" to
entice providers to participate in the Medicaid program); Peter Cunningham & Jessica May, Medicaid
Patients Increasingly ConcentratedAmong Physicians, TRACKING REP. No. 16 (Ctr. for Studying
Health
Sys.
Change.
Washington
D.C.),
Aug.
2006,
at
1
http: //www.hschange.com/CONTENT/866/866.pdf("Medicaid payment rates, which are considerably
lower than physician payment rates under Medicare or private insurance, historically have deterred
physician participation in Medicaid.").
44. Cunningham & May. supra note 43. at 1. Additionally. 14.6% of physicians in both
2000-2001 and 2004-2005 reported that they derived no revenue from Medicaid, a rise from 12.9%
in 1996- 1997. Id. The number of physicians accepting no new Medicaid patients is much higher than
the number of physicians reporting refusal to accept other patients: in 2004-2005, 4.3% of physicians
reported that they were not accepting new privately insured patients. and 3.4% reported that they were
not accepting new Medicare patients. Id.
45.Jd. at I.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 2. 3. Solo practitioners and physicians practicing with a single partner reporting
acceptance of no new Medicaid patients increased from 29.0% in 1996-1997 to 35.3% in 2004-2005.
Id. at 3. Likewise, from 1996 1997 to 2004 2005 small group practices limiting acceptance of new
Medicaid patients rose from 16.2% to 24.0%. Id. at 3 tbl.4. Contrary to the decreased participation of
solo practitioners and small groups. the participation of institutional providers increased slightly. Id. at
2-3 tbl.4. Despite the shift in provision of care to Medicaid patients. solo practitioners and small groups
received 41.7% of Medicaid revenue compared to 30.5% by institutional providers. Id. at 2, 5 supp.
tbl.2.
48. Id. at 3, 5 supp. tbl.2.
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approximately two-thirds cited late payments as a contributing factor.49 Common
51
5°
billing issues include down-coding and retrospective denials of services.
Examples of burdensome paperwork requirements include "clinical time
stealers" such as clinically irrelevant documentation required to support medical
necessity and the level of a service billed.52
In spite of federal efforts to simplify health care administration for both
health care providers and health plans, vast differences persist in documentation
and reporting guidelines for health plans. Congress enacted the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 3 in part to standardize
54
electronic transmissions in health care in order to reduce health care costs.
DHHS, acting with authority vested by HIPAA, adopted standardized code sets
for reporting health care services. 5 At the same time, however, DHHS refused to
adopt standard guidelines for all but one of the medical services code sets, citing
numerous "practical barriers" such as inconsistent definitions of codes.56 Thus,

49. Id. at 3, 5 supp. tbl.2.
50. Down-coding by a health plan includes reducing the code billed for a service to a code of lesser
value. See REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON MED. SERV., AM. MED. ASS'N, PHYSICIANS' EXPERIENCES WITH
RETROSPECTIVE DENIAL OF PAYMENT AND DOWN-CODING BY MANAGED CARE PLANS 3 (2000),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/372/iOOcms5.doc. Health plans often perform down-coding
without review of the medical record. Id.
51. Id. at 2 3. Retrospective denials involve the denial of payment for services already provided
to a patient. Id. at 1.
52. See Alice G. Gosfield, The Doctor-PatientRelationship as the Business Casefor Quality:
Doing Well by Doing Right, 37 J. HEALTH L. 197. 203 (2004).
One of the most frustrating aspects of the current practice environment for most
physicians is the time they must devote to irrelevant documentation. The
documentation demands of evaluation and management codes (E/M). the failure
to comply with which can lead to false claims exposure, has nothing to do with
the clinical treatment of the patient. This documentation has been developed
purely for post-payment auditing purposes to verify that the level of code and the
reimbursement associated with it were appropriate to the service. Similarly, the
documentation of the medical necessity of specific services in the course of
treatment is neither necessary nor clinically useful, but is required primarily for
post-payment auditing.
Id.
53. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936, 1936, 2103 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles 26, 29, and 42).
54. HIPAA § 261. 110 Stat. at 2021.
55. Id. 50,312, 50.370 (Aug. 17. 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 162.1002 (2006)).
56. Id. at 50,323. The American Medical Association (AMA), creator and distributor of one of the
adopted standard code sets, Current Procedural Terminology (CPT), responded with the following
concerns and proposal:
The AMA believes that standard implementation guidelines for code sets are
essential for uniform national application of the code sets. If standard guidelines
for medical code sets were adopted, many attachments would be eliminated. If
health plans and physicians are permitted to implement and interpret medical data
code sets as they see fit, the purpose of administrative simplification will not be
achieved. An important part of administrative simplification and reduced
regulatory hassle certainly includes the simplification and uniformity of
instructions for the coding of health care services. The overwhelming amount of
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health plans retain great discretion in the imposition of documentation and
reporting requirements upon providers of health care.
As the options for providing medical assistance diversify and the number of
managed care plans increases, the billing and reimbursement complexities
associated with the Medicaid program also increase. 7 Shifting from centralized
claims processing and administration to administration by multiple plans by way
of a variety of options distributes burdens to Medicaid-participating providers by8
requiring providers to adhere to the unique requirements of each health plan.
Instead of encountering billing issues and reporting requirements with one
entity, Medicaid providers face these issues with each Medicaid-contracted
health plan.5 ' Thus, in order to assess the impact of the South Carolina Medicaid
reform plan upon the provision of care to beneficiaries, it is necessary to
examine the implications of placing additional burdens upon providers. While
Medicaid reforms may result in improved quality of care and reduced costs,
access to care by Medicaid beneficiaries may be limited if providers elect to
avoid the requirements imposed by Medicaid and its contracted health plans.
B.

FocusingFraudand Abuse Efforts on Medicaid Providers

The current Medicaid environment stresses the importance of identifying
fraud and abuse by Medicaid providers, and the FCA will undoubtedly play an
essential role in this effort.6" Furthermore, the financial incentives provided to
states enacting false claims acts suggests that states will mimic the federal
government's utilization of the federal FCA. 6" Combined, the complexity of

paperwork to which physicians are subject would be significantly reduced if
coding guidelines were standardized within electronic transactions. The AMA
believes that the CPT guidelines and instructions should be specified as a national
standard for implementing CPT codes.
Mary L. Kufther, Am. Med. Ass'n, Statement of the American Medical Association to the Workgroup
on Electronic Data Interchange Regarding HIPAA Implementation Issues 6 (January 27, 2004),
http://www.wedi.org/cmsUploads/pdfUpload/eventsPresentationlnformation/pub/ACF2161 .pdf
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 56. But cf S.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 22, at 21 ("To create a value based delivery system, the role of the state must move from the
myopic function of processing individual claims to a management approach that moves the whole
system toward quality.").
59. See infra text accompanying notes 65 and 66.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 26 and 33 34.
61. John Gibeaut, Seeking the Cure: With Health CareFraudRampant, StatesAre Urgedto Pass
Their Own False Claims Acts, But Foes Warn of Windfallsfor Plaintiffs Lawyers. A.B.A. J., October
2006, at 44, 46.
With health care fraud as the No. I drain on federal and state treasuries,
supporters can't see how any state can reject an offer that's as good as the one
Congress made in the Deficit Reduction Act. Supporters say the federal False
Claims Act's success virtually ensures similar accomplishments at the same level.
Id. at 46; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(h)(b) (2006) (identifying provisions that must be included in a
state false claims act to qualify for an increased percentage of recovery).
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reporting and documentation requirements for Medicaid providers and the
breadth of the FCA and state false claims laws act as powerful disincentives for
Medicaid participation. Thus, even if the Medicaid reform plan attains its goals
of higher quality of care and reduced Medicaid costs, the cumulative effect of
false claims enforcement and administrative complexities may prove too great
for providers.
1.

Complexity: Setting the Stagefor False Claims Allegations

Discussions of the current health care environment inevitably refer to it as
complex. For example, one court referred to the Medicare regulations as
"technical, complex, and numerous." 62 Commentators echo the sentiment.
"[T]here are many uncertainties about the billing requirements imposed on
providers, and doubtless, there are instances when well-meaning individuals
with billing responsibilities are simply unable to parse these complexities."63
Another commentator concisely stated that "the current environment is simply
too complex."64
Medicaid, by its nature, imposes a far more complex environment upon
health care providers than even Medicare. Because of the flexibility afforded to
states in administering their Medicaid programs, state Medicaid programs vary
greatly in terms of administration and enforcement. "Medicaid, like Medicare, is
a huge and complex program. Unlike Medicare, however, Medicaid is not just
one program with fairly uniform national rules. Instead, Medicaid is effectively
51 different programs with eligibility, benefits, reimbursement, and
65
administrative policies that vary widely within broad federal guidelines.
Moreover, differences also exist in the policies of managed care organizations
within a single Medicaid plan.66 Therefore, Medicaid reform measures that

62. United States v. Chen, No. 2:04-cv-00859-PMP-PAL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35845, at *24
(D. Nev. May 30, 2006): see also United States v. Medica-Rents Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 742. 770 (N.D.
Tex. 2003) (noting the complexities of Medicare coding and billing).
63. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the
Backlash Against FraudandAbuseEnforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 294 (1999) (footnote omitted).
64. Gosfield, supra note 52. at 209 (advocating simplifying requirements imposed on health care
providers).
65. SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 36-37. In addition to the Medicaid programs for each state and
the District of Columbia, Medicaid programs exist for Puerto Rico and American Samoa, Guam,
Northern Mariana Islands, and Virgin Islands. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-707,
MEDICAID PROGRAM INTEGRITY: STATE AND FEDERAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND DETECT IMPROPER

4 (2004).
66. Carolyn Buppert, Billing For Nurse PractitionerServices: Guidelinesfor APs, Physicians,
Employees, and Insurers. 4 MEDSCAPE NURSES, 2002, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/
422935 print ("Medicaid reimbursement is further complicated by the fact that many Medicaid
recipients are enrolled in managed care plans. Managed care plans' policies on reimbursement differ
from the state and federal rules governing reimbursement when the patient is not enrolled in managed
care.").
PAYMENTS
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distribute administrative responsibilities to other entities will result in increased
complexity of the system.
2. False Claims Basics
As reforms reshape the structure of Medicaid programs, the FCA continues
to hold providers within its grasp. In an FCA action, the government, or the
relator,6 must prove the following three elements by a preponderance of the
evidence 68 :
(1) that the defendant caused to be presented to the United
States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or that the
defendant made, used, or caused another to make or use a false
statement or document; (2) that the defendant did so for the
purpose of obtaining payment from the government or approval
of a claim against the government; and (3) that the defendant
knowingly presented a claim that was false or fraudulent.69
The FCA reaches not only those who submit false claims directly to the federal
government, but also those who submit claims to Medicaid agencies and
contracted health plans. 7 1 "Thus, claims submitted to private insurers who
administer the Medicare or Medicaid programs on behalf of the government are
covered. ,71

67. See infra text accompanying note 91.
68.31 U.S.C. § 373 1(c) (2000).
69. United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 716 17 (N.D. 111.2006) (citation omitted).
70. Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Qui Tam Actions: Best Practices For Relator's Counsel, 38 J.
HEALTH L. 367, 369 (2005) (noting that the FCA applies to Medicaid claims if federal funds provide
a portion of the payment); see also Shelley R. Slade, False Clainis Act May Reach Managed Care
Organizations,HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. MAG. (Jan. 2002), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi m3257/is 1 56/ai 82067681 /print: (discussing the scope of the FCA in the context of managed
care): GOSFIELD. supra note 31, at § 5:10 (stating that the FCA's definition of a claim extends to claims
submitted by a provider to a Medicare or Medicaid managed care organization).
The potential for false claims liability exists despite the prevalence of Medicaid managed care
arrangements involving a fixed, or capitated, payment to the managed care organization in which a
provider is enrolled. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 24. at 18-20 (discussing the types of fraud and abuse
in capitation and fee-for-service arrangements). The general view is that risk-based managed care
arrangements create the incentive to underutilize services, id. at 20, while fee-for-service creates an
incentive to overutilize services and submit more claims for higher payments, id. at 18-19. However,
managed care organizations may or may not pay providers on a capitated basis. Id. at 19-20. Some
providers continue to receive payments on a fee-for-service basis. Id.; see also Gosfield, supra note 52,
at 205 06 (discussing incentives created by fee-for-service and capitated payments).
71. Caldwell. supra note 70, at 369-70.
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A variety of acts beyond submitting claims for services not performed2 may
result in the submission of a false claim and subject a provider to potential
liability under the FCA. Other less obvious grounds for false claims allegations
include violations of the anti-kickback and Stark laws" and "reverse false
claims."74 The most controversial false claims actions, however, allege billing
misrepresentations and failure to adhere to regulations and billing guidelines 75 as
the basis for establishing the knowing submission of a false claim. These false
claims actions are controversial because the regulations and guidelines that
providers must follow are complicated and often ambiguous. Common examples
of these types of false claims cases include those based on allegations of
upcoding, 6 unbundling," and false certifications of medical necessity.78

72. Mark H. Schlein & Chris Barry-Smith. Am. Health Lawyers Ass'n, State Attorneys General:
A Dynamic Force in Health Care Fraud Enforcement (Sept. 26, 2004). available at WL AHLAPAPERS P09260418 (noting that submitting claims for services or goods not provided constitutes a
common false claims allegation).
73. In general. the anti-kickback statute prohibits soliciting, receiving, and offering of payment
for referrals of individuals to persons for services that are paid by federal health programs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). Subject to specific exceptions, the Stark laws prohibit
physicians from referring Medicare or Medicaid patients for certain services to entities with which the
physician or an immediate family memberhas a fimancial relationship. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)-(h) (2000
& Supp. III 2003). Many courts recognize that violations of the anti-kickback or Stark laws may form
the basis of false claims allegations. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs.
of Am., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 258, 266 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that allegations of Stark and antikickback violations are sufficient to support a claim under the FCA); see also Jonathan L. Diesenhaus
& Laura F. Laemmle, Enforcement of Health Care Kickback Prohibitions Through the Civil False
Claims Act: Recent Trends, U.S. ATTY'S' BULL. (U.S. D.O.J. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys,
Washington D.C.), Sept. 2005, at 36, 39-42, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia reading room/usab5305.pdf (discussing theories of FCA liability for anti-kickback and Stark
violations).
74. Reverse false claims typically include allegations that a recipient of government payments
engaged in conduct to avoid paying money owed to the government. GOSFIELD, supra note 31, § 5:10;
see, e.g.. Cantrell ex rel. United States v. N.Y. Univ., 326 F. Supp. 2d 468, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding that "underreporting of monies owed to the government" by a federally-funded defendant
constituted a cognizable "reverse false claim" under the FCA).
75. See In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig.. 221 F.R-D. 318.351 (D. Conn. 2004) ("]here have been
numerous cases imposing FCA liability, and even criminal false claims liability, based on violations ofMedicare
manual provisions."), rev inparton other groundssub nom. United States v. BaylorUniv. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d
263, 263, 265 (2d Cir. 2006).
76. See, e.g., Cantrell, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (alleging that reporting a code to Medicare
representing complex evaluation services for administration of vaccines in a clinical trial constituted
upcoding and false claims). "Upcoding' reflects the practice of using a billing code that provides a
higher payment rate than the billing code that actually reflects the service furnished to the patient."
Publication of the O1G Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals. 63 Fed. Reg. 8987, 8990 n.15
(Feb. 23, 1998). The problem with false claims allegations of upcoding are that "there are no federal
statutes or regulations describing proper coding procedures or standards for [codes] that are completed
on the form." Robert Salcido, The Government's Increasing Use of the False Claims Act Against the
Health CareIndustry, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 457, 477 (2003). The ambiguities in coding have allowed the
government to "augment[] its FCA recoveries" by applying different standards in reviewing claims. Id.
at 479.
[T]he OG will identify conditions.., that are difficult to diagnose and that can
exist even when clinical evidence does not support the condition. When the
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In addition to submitting or causing the submission of a "false" claim, the
FCA requires that a person knowingly submit or cause to be submitted a false
claim.71 Under the FCA, knowingly means that a person "(1) has actual

physician documents the condition, the OG looks beyond the physician
documentation to the clinical evidence to evaluate whether the claim was
correctly coded. Alternatively, when the physician does not precisely document
the condition, but the condition is supported clinically, the government rejects the
claim on the grounds that the physician did not document the record.
Id.
77. "'Unbundling' is the practice of submitting bills piecemeal or in fragmented fashion to
maximize the reimbursement for various tests or procedures that are required to be billed together and
therefore at a reduced cost." Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63
Fed. Reg. at 8990 n.20. The CMS created the National Correct Coding initiative (NCC1) to analyze the
appropriateness of medical service codes when billed with other codes to Medicare. CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CORRECT
CODING INITIATIVE POLICY MANUAL FOR MEDICARE SERVICES Vii (2005) (Version 12.3),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalCorrectCodlnitEd/Downloads/manual.zip
(download the file
"manual.zip"; open the file "INTROfinal.doc"). "Unfortunately. NCCI is not designed to handle the
myriad of code combinations in the commercial and Medicaid population." TEX. ASS'N OF HEALTH
PLANS, POSITION ON THE STANDARDIZATION OF CODE SETS, BUNDLING EDITS AND LOGIC 10 (2004),

www.tahp.org/advocacy.cfm (follow "Our Issues" hyperlink, then follow "standardized coding"
hyperlink to download document). Other than Medicare. most health plans utilize commercial code edits
that are rarely made available to providers. See Am. Med. Ass'n, Testimony Before the National
Conference of Insurance Legislators Health Insurance Meeting, Bringing Fairness and Transparency
to Health Plan Payer Contracting and Payment Processes 3, 11 (July 8, 2005) (discussing the "black
box" mentality of health plans that refuse to disclose reimbursement policies), http://www.amaassn.org/amal /pub/upload/mm/378/ncoil testimony.pdf.
78. Timothy P. Blanchard, "Afedical Necessity" Determinations A ContinuingHealthcarePolicy
Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599, 604 (2004) (discussing standards for determining medical necessity, and
noting that the Medicare and Medicaid statutes fail to define medical necessity).
Today, the question of"medically necessary" is compound. It is in part a medical
science and in part a political or societal decision (what "necessary" services are
"reasonable" for taxpayers or members of an insurance risk pool to shoulder?).
"Medical necessity is rarely defined, largely unexamined, generally
misunderstood and idiosyncratically applied in medical and insurance practice."
Id. (quoting Medical Necessity: From Theory to Practice,Hearing on Examining Issues with Regard
to the Delivery of Necessary Health Care in the United States Before the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. 32 (1999) (statement of Linda A. Bergthold. Project
Director, Decreasing Variation in Medical Necessity Decision Making at the Center for Health Policy,
Stanford University)). For example, the only direction supplied by the Medicare statutes is that payment
may not be made unless services are "reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness
or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member." 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)
(2000). Ifno national policy governs the service, Medicare contractors typically make medical necessity
decisions on a case-by-case basis or in the formulation of local policies. Blanchard, supra, at 606 07.
Similarly, state Medicaid agencies may place "appropriate limits" on medical necessity, but neither the
federal Medicaid statutes nor the regulations provide a definition of medical necessity. Id. at 600
(quoting 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (2004)). Despite the general lack of standards and definitions for
medical necessity, providers may be held liable under the FCA for falsely certifying the medical
necessity of services on claim forms. Id. at 604-05; see, e.g.. In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig.. 221
F.R.D. at 347 (holding that the submission of claim forms implicitly certified that services were
'reasonable and necessary" and that claims for services that were not reasonable and necessary were
legally false).
79. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
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knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or
falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity
of the information."8 ° Thus, courts and commentators commonly assert that the
FCA excludes honest mistakes such as those due to negligence or inadvertence. 8
While the FCA requires that a person knew of the claim's falsity, "no proof of
specific intent to defraud is required. '' 2
In defending against false claims allegations, providers often challenge the
falsity and knowledge elements of the FCA."3 The government's failure to
identify a violation of a regulation, rule, or standard may preclude a finding of
falsity.84 Furthermore, in the case of an ambiguous regulation, rule, or standard,
a provider is more likely to prevail in challenging the knowledge element when
the provider adheres to a reasonable interpretation of the regulation, rule, or
standard.85 A provider's reliance on the instructions of a government entity in
submitting and receiving payment for a claim may provide an additional defense
to the FCA's scienter requirement where "the government knows of the
defendant's practices
and notwithstanding that knowledge pays on the
86
claims.
defendant's
Despite these possible defenses to falsity and knowledge, concern and
uncertainty exist due to the vast number of regulations, rules, and standards
governing health care providers. In light of providers' duty to familiarize

80. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2000).
81. See, e.g., Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1995)) (stating
that the FCA requires more than an "innocent mistake or mere negligence"); Health Care Initiatives
Under the False Claims Act that Impact Hospitals: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Immigrationand
Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary.105th Cong. 16 (1998) (statement of Lewis Morris, Assistant
Inspector General for Legal Affairs, Office of Inspector General. Department of Health and Human
Serv) (asserting that "contrary to what some critics may have said, billing errors due to simple
negligence, mistakes, or inadvertence are not actionable under the False Claims Act"); Jost & Davies,
supra note 63. at 294 (arguing that the scienter requirement of the FCA "distinguish[es] between those
who mistakenly transgress billing requirements or other restrictions and those who know that they are.
or are reckless as to the chance that they may be, violating the law but act anyway").
82.31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
83. Salcido. supra note 76, at 488-93 (discussing possible defenses to the FCA elements of falsity
and knowledge).
84. Id.at 488 89 & n.148 (citing numerous cases in which a plaintiffs failure to identify a
defendant's non-compliance with a rule or regulation precluded a finding of falsity).
85. Id. at 490: see, e.g., United States v. Medica-Rents Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 742, 771-75 (N.D.
Tex. 2003) (precluding a finding of the FCA's requisite scienter where "considerable confusion"
surrounded the appropriate reporting of medical equipment and the defendant possessed a good faith
belief that the code used was appropriate and adhered to the instructions of a Medicare carrier).
86. Salcido, supra note 76, at 492 & n. 156 (citations omitted) see also United States v. Southland
Mgmt. Corp.. 326 F.3d 669. 682 & n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the "government knowledge
defense" provides "a means by which the defendant can rebut the government's assertion of the
4knowing' presentation of a false claim. Inevitably, the extent of the government's knowledge is also
bound up with whether the claim itself was false.").
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themselves with the requirements of government programs,8 the sheer number
of these requirements may effectively subject providers to a standard of
negligence for false claims:
[P]roviders are held responsible for being familiar with the
huge volume of published manuals and regulations governing
the provision of health care services to government program
beneficiaries, and the billing for such services. The government
is likely to deem the submission of bills contrary to such
requirements to be in "reckless disregard" of such
requirements, even if the requirements were not actually known
to the person or persons responsible for the submission of the
bill. Given the vast quantity of regulatory material applicable to
government health care programs, the government's position in
such matters can in effect create a negligence standard for
providers, the violation of which subjects them not only to
restitution but, under the federal False Claims Act, to possible
treble damages and to immense fines.88
Several additional aspects of the FCA and patterns in false claims cases pose
potential barriers to provider participation in the Medicaid program. First, the
FCA authorizes qui tam (also called "whistleblower"89 ) actions.9 ° In a qui tam
action, a plaintiff, known as a relator, 9 files a complaint under seal and serves a
copy of the complaint along with a "written disclosure of substantially all92
material evidence and information the person possesses" to the government.
During the time the complaint is under seal, the government investigates the
allegations, and the defendant is not notified of the qui tam action.93 After
94
investigating the complaint, the government may or may not elect to intervene.
A relator may pursue false claims allegations if the government elects not to
intervene." In general, if the government chooses to intervene, the relator

87. In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig., 221 F.R.D. 318. 328 (D. Conn. 2004). rev 'd in part on
other grounds sub nona. United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 263 (2d Cir. 2006)
(quoting United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 200 1)).
88. Russell Hayman. Voluntary Disclosure. in HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE 193, 198
(Practising Law Institute 1999).
89. The whistleblower provision of the FCA protects an employee from wrongful discharge or
discrimination for initiating a qui tam action, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000). For a general discussion of
this provision, see Caldwell. supra note 70, at 383-85.
90. 31 U.S.C. § 3730. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of qui tam actions and the
interaction between a relator and the government, see generally Caldwell, supra note 70, at 374 85.
91. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 24.
92. § 3730(b)(2).
93. Id. A complaint must remain under seal for a minimum of sixty days. Id. The government may
move to extend the time period a complaint remains under seal. § 3730(b)(3).
94. § 3730(b)(4)(A)-(B).
95. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
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recovers a minimum of 15% to a maximum of 25% of the proceeds and
reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees.96 If the government elects not to
intervene, the relator recovers a minimum of 25% to a maximum of 30% of the
proceeds and reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees. 97
From fiscal year 1987 to 2005, qui tam actions resulted in recoveries
totaling more than $9.6 billion of the total $15 billion recovered in false claims
settlements and judgments.98 While described as an essential tool in identifying
health care fraud and abuse, 99 the financial incentives to "whistleblow" raise
concerns about the accuracy of false claims allegations and the motivations
underlying qui tam actions. For example, "[flundamental misunderstanding of
the extent of the relator's knowledge can cause the government to expend its
resources investigating, only to find, after a long goose chase, that there is no
case."'0 0 Additionally, some commentators believe that some potential
whistleblowers may seek and evaluate jobs based on the likelihood of
discovering wrongdoings in hopes of reporting to the government and obtaining
a portion of the recovery.'
Though the government retains the right under the FCA to dismiss qui tam
cases, 112 the government rarely applies the brakes in qui tam actions." 3 These
concerns carry over to actions brought pursuant to state false claim acts because
of the possibility that state false claims laws will also include qui tam
provisions.0 4 In fact, qui tam actions brought pursuant to state false claims laws

96. § 3730(d)(1). If the court finds that an action is based primarily on information other than that
provided by the relator, the relator receives a maximum of 10% of the recovery. Id. For an analysis of
the FCA and factors affecting a relator's share of recovery, see Paul D. Scott. Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr. for
Continuing Legal Educ.. The Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement (November 28-30.
2001) available at Westlaw N02CFCB ABA-LGLED H- 1.
97. § 3730(d)(2).
98. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-320R, INFORMATION ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT
LITIGATION: BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 5 (2006).
99. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 33 (discussing findings that show Medicaid qui tam
relators provide information resulting in the discovery of otherwise unidentifiable fraud and abuse).
100. Caldwell, supra note 70. at 385.
101. See Schlein & Barry-Smith, supra note 72.
102. In qui tam cases in which the government intervenes, the government may dismiss a qui tam
action over the objections of a relator so long as the relator is provided notice of the motion for
dismissal and an opportunity for a hearing on the motion. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2000). Some
courts have held that the government may seek dismissal without intervening. Scott, supra note 96
(citing Juliano ex rel. U.S. v. Fed. Asset Disposition Ass'n, 736 F. Supp. 348, 351 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd,
959 F.2d 1101, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); see also Ridenour ex rel. U.S. v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925,
933-35. 940 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that prior intervention is not necessary for dismissal of a qui tam
action brought pursuant to the FCA and noting other courts that have similarly held or stated the same
in dicta) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 341, 341 (2005).
103. Scott, supra note 96 (The government "rarely exercises the power ... to dismiss [FCA]
cases without the consent of the relator.").
104. Under the DRA, for a state to increase its share of a recovery by an additional 10%. the
provisions of a state's false claims act must be "at least as effective in rewarding and facilitating qui tam
actions for false or fraudulent claims as those described" in the FCA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396h(b)(2) (2006).
The DRA tasks the U.S. DHHS's Office of Inspector General (O1G). together with the Attorney
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may result in a greater cause for concern due to the potential for greater
recovery.'i 5
The inherent pressures exerted by the FCA compel most providers to settle
false claims cases. 6 The potential for astronomical penalties and damages7
constitutes a major factor in inducing settlements of false claims allegations.'
In most false claims actions, providers settle because of the potential liability
and the threat of a mandatory five-year exclusion from any federal health care
program, even if they believe the case is defendable.'0 8 Furthermore, the costs of
litigation0 9 and the threat of negative publicity'' 0 may cause settlement to appear
as the only feasible option to many health care providers. The coercive nature of
settlement agreements for false claims allegations not only impacts the
immediate provider, but also deprives other providers of interpretations of law
essential to preventing and defending a false claims suit."' Thus, FCA
enforcement pushes providers in an endless cycle of allegations and settlements

General, with determining if state laws meet the requirements. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396h(a) (2006). The
inclusion of provisions more restrictive than those specified in the FCA may result in a determination
that a state law fails to meet the effectiveness requirement. Publication of OIG's Guidelines for
Evaluating State False Claims Acts, 71 Fed. Reg. 48,552, 48,554 (Aug. 21, 2006). The OIG evaluates
a state's law on a case-by-case basis and considers whether it includes specific provisions relating to
qui tam actions, such as procedural aspects and percentage shares at least as generous to the relator as
the federal FCA. Id. at 48,553-54.
105. See Publication of OIG's Guidelines for Evaluating State False Claims Acts, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 48,553 (noting that in actions brought pursuant to the FCA, qui tam relators may receive a portion
of the federal share of recovery, but not the state's share of recovery: however, relators in qui tam
actions brought pursuant to state false claims laws typically stand to recover a portion of the state's
recovery.) By appending a state false claims action to a federal FCA action under the theory of pendant
jurisdiction, it should be possible for a relator to recover a portion of both the federal and state
recoveries. See GOSFIELD, supra note 31, at § 6.10; see also, SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 37 ("The
financial incentives and procedural opportunities for whistleblowers to identify and prosecute Medicaid
fraud are significantly stronger in states with their own false claims acts than in states without such
acts.").
106. Leon Aussprung, FraudandAbuse: FederalCivil Health Care LitigationandSettlement, 19
J. LEGAL MED. 1. 17 (1998) (asserting that most institutions settle rather than risk litigation) Schlein
& Barry-Smith, supra note 72.
107. See Schlein & Barry-Smith, supra note 72; see supra text accompanying notes 28 30.
108. Schlein & Barry-Smith, supra note 72.
109. The FCA provides that the defendant will bear the burden of "reasonable expenses" and
'reasonable attorneys' fees and costs" of a successful relator. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)( 1) (2000); see also
Keith D. Barber et al., ProlificPlaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent Developments in False Claims Act
Litigation. 1 IND. HEALTHL. REV. 131, 172 (2004) ("The government's abusive investigation practices
do not have small consequences. They disrupt the provision of health care services by forcing providers
to divert often-substantial resources, time, and human capital to respond.")
110. See Aussprung, supra note 106, at 46-49 (noting the importance of providers' reputations
and suggesting methods to minimize negative publicity).
111. See Joan H. Krause, Health CareProvidersand the PublicFisc:Paradigmsof Government
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REv. 121, 146 (2001) ("Because settlements do not
include detailed judicial findings regarding intent, it is unclear whether providers choose to settle
allegations where they honestly believe the regulations to be unclear." (footnote omitted)).
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without providing a solid ground on which other providers can stand to prevent
or defend false claims allegations." 2
3.

Enforcing the False Claims Act

Past enforcement efforts by the federal government illustrate the concerns
about the effects of enforcing the federal FCA and state false claims acts in an
increasingly complex health care industry. Enforcement of the FCA throughout
the 1990s brought to light the array of regulations and guidelines imposed upon
health care providers. 1 3 Seemingly brushing aside concerns about the number of
regulations and guidelines, the federal government pursued investigations that
brought strong criticisms from the health care industry.' 14 The responsive
outcries from health care providers and organizations 115 eventually led to the
development of investigatory guidelines for false claims." 6 While these
guidelines signify the government's recognition of the need for uniform

112. See Joan H. Krause. Regulating,Guiding,andEnforcingtHealthCareFraud,60 N.Y.U.ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 241,273 (2004) ("Private litigation, in particular. can interfere with necessary regulation
by diverting limited government resources, generating unfavorable precedent, and damaging regulators'
relationships with the industry.").
113. See, e.g., Health CareInitiativesUnder the False ClaimsAct thatImpactHospitals:Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigrationand Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 81, at
58 (prepared statement of William L. Lane, President, Holy Family Hospital and Medical Center)
(arguing against the "inappropriateness of using the False Claims Act for addressing hospital
billing-errors which largely are the result of hundreds of pages of law, thousands of pages of
regulations and interpretations of those regulations which differwidely among the more than forty fiscal
intermediaries that administer the Medicare payment program for the federal government across the
country").
114. See, e.g.. Aussprung, supra note 104. at 27 (discussing the health care industry's criticisms
of the OIG's Physicians at Teaching Hospitals (PATH) audits).
115. See, e.g., Health CareInitiatives Under the False Claims Act that Impact Hospitals: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigrationand Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary.supra note 81, at
48 (prepared statement of Gordon M. Sprenger. Executive Officer, Allina Health Systems) (stating that
"the government has engaged in a massive recovery project based on no statutory or regulatory basis").
116. In 1998, the Deputy Attorney General issued a memorandum specifying guidelines for false
claims investigations. Memorandum from Eric C. Holder. Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen. to all United States
Attorneys, all First Assistant United States Attorneys, all Civil Health Care Fraud Coordinators in the
Offices of United States Attorneys, and all Trial Attorneys in the Civil Division Commercial Litigation
Section, Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health Care Matters (June 3, 1998),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/readingroom/chcm.htm. The guidelines were issued to ensure enforcement
of the FCA in a "fair and even-handed manner." Id. Before making false claims allegations. the
guidelines direct the government to evaluate whether there is a "sufficient legal and factual predicate
for proceeding." Id. The government must first determine whether a false claim exists by analyzing all
relevant regulations and guidance. Id. Then the government must assess whether the provider
"knowingly" submitted the false claim, considering actual or constructive notice of regulations or
policies; clarity of the regulations; magnitude or pervasiveness of the false claims; existence of a
compliance program and efforts to comply with billing rules; "past remedial efforts"; reliance on
guidance issued by a program or its agents; and prior audits putting a provider on notice. Id.
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enforcement measures, the effectiveness 17of the guidelines in preventing
inappropriate false claims actions is debated.
The recent Medicare case United States v. Prabhu.18 supports the
apprehension of Medicaid providers about potential false-claims liability for
noncompliance with a multitude of regulations, rules, and standards. Despite the
physician's good faith efforts to comply with ambiguous Medicare regulations
and standards, the federal government aggressively pursued an FCA action." 9
While the action was ultimately dismissed, Prabhu is a paradigmatic example of
false claims enforcement sending a fatal blow to providers participating in
government programs; the FCA action caused the
physician to cease providing
20
services that substantially benefitted his patients.
In Prabhu, the government alleged the physician knowingly submitted false
claims to Medicare in violation of the FCA. 12' The government claimed that the
physician had billed for pulmonary rehabilitation services that were not covered
by Medicare, billed for pulmonary tests without performing services required in
billing the code or documenting a written report, and billed for medically
unnecessary services."' The court held as a matter of law that the government
failed to produce sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find
that the defendant physician knowingly submitted false claims in violation of the
FCA and granted the defendant physician's motion for summary judgment,
dismissing the case with prejudice.'23
The court held, as to the coverage of pulmonary rehabilitation services and
the billing of the services with a code for simple stress tests, that the government
had failed to prove a violation of any rule, regulation, or standard.'24 The
evidence established that from 1981 to 2000 Medicare explicitly recognized the
coverage of pulmonary rehabilitation in a variety of publications and continued
to pay for pulmonary rehabilitation; the government's expert acknowledged the
coverage of pulmonary rehabilitation services in a variety of jurisdictions and
settings, and the Medicare carrier's Medical Director confirmed the absence of
any policy that prohibited the billing of pulmonary rehabilitation component
services.12 5 Most notably, both the Medicare carrier's Medical Director and the
government's own expert agreed that Medicare coverage had always extended to

117. Krause, supra note 111, at 139 (noting that while the health care industry remains concerned
about the DOJ's compliance, "Congress appears satisfied"); see also Robert Salcido, supra note 76, at
465 66 (identifying three projects with national scope that the DOJ initiated without designating them
as "national initiatives" as specified by the investigatory guidelines).
118. 442 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1008 (D. Nev. 2006).
119. Id.at 1010 11,1030.
120. Id.at 1010, 1023.
121.lId. at 1010.
122. Id.at 1011.
123. Id.at 1026.
124. Id.at 1027.
125.Id.at1012-14.
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pulmonary rehabilitation component services such as pulmonary stress tests. 2 6
In addition, the government "failed to prove falsity as a matter of law, by failing
to dispute the overwhelming evidence that [the physician] was following the
instructions provided by the Medicare carrier in billing for pulmonary stress
tests as part of his rehabilitation program."12' The court stressed that over a
period of thirteen years, the physician and his billing service had repeatedly
contacted the Medicare carrier for guidance, and the carrier had never informed
the physician that it had changed its policy, never transmitted any provider
notices that prohibited the billing practice, such as bulletins or flyers, and never
denied the physician's
claims that would have indicated the government's
128
advice had changed.
Regarding the government's allegations that the code representing a simple
stress test required the physician to perform additional services and a written
report, the court concluded that "the government's interpretation of the CPT
[c]ode for [the] test is wrong., 129 In concluding that the government failed to
prove the falsity of the claims, the court relied upon guidance issued by the
AMA, which published the code, "expressly refuted" the government's claim
and the fact that the government's own expert agreed with the guidance. 130 As to
the written report, the court concluded that the government failed to establish the
falsity of the claim because the medical director of the Medicare carrier
conceded that this requirement did not exist, and the carrier
had never issued any
131
policy requiring a written report for a simple stress test.
The court went on to hold that even if the court had found that some of the
claims were false, the government failed to prove that the physician knowingly
submitted a false claim'3 2 because the regulations were ambiguous, the
physician's billing practice was consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the
regulations, and the physician and his staff believed in good faith that the
interpretation was proper. 3 3 The court stated that when a person's "conduct is
consistent with a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous regulatory guidance,"
the person does not "knowingly" submit a false claim. 134 In this area that
government agents admitted was "rife with confusion," the physician
made good
35
faith efforts to comply with program requirements and billing rules.'

126. Id. at 1014.
127. Id. at 1027.
128. Id. From 1991 to 2004, Medicare representatives confirmed the appropriateness of the
physician's billing. Id. at 1017 20. The physician sought confirmation of his billing during an on-site
visit to his office, in numerous telephone conversations, in a meeting between the physician's billing
supervisor and Medicare's provider relations representative, and by a panel of speakers at a Medicare
seminar. Id.
129. Id. at 1028.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1029.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1030.
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In addition, the court relied upon the physician's compliance with
instructions for submitting claims, the carrier's advice to bill for the test, and the
government's awareness of the physician's practices during the 1990s because
of an "extensive criminal and civil investigation., 136 Thus the court concluded:
Under these circumstances, . . . the Government cannot
demonstrate that the Defendant knowingly submitted false
claims. It would be simply irrationalfor any person subjected
to the level of scrutiny to which [the physician] was subjected
to knowingly submit any claim that
was questionable or
137
borderline, let alone flat-out wrong.'
Relating to the government's allegations of medically unnecessary services
and insufficient documentation, the court concluded that the physician's claims
were not false as a matter of law. 138 Because the government had not identified
violation of any controlling rule, regulation, or standard, since neither CMS nor
the Medicare carrier articulated any such guidelines, 139 the certification of
medical necessity on the claim form was "literally true," and the government
failed to establish the falsity of the claims as a matter of law. 14 ° The court
reasoned that the claims were in fact clinically necessary because the physician
documented his determination that the patients would benefit from additional
treatment, and the government failed to establish falsity by not providing any
clinical evidence that the services were not medically necessary. 4'
Regarding documentation, the claims were not false because no articulated,
objective standard existed to determine the appropriate documentation required,
and the physician's documentation fell "within the range of reasonable medical
and scientific judgment regarding how to document the medical necessity of
pulmonary rehabilitation services.""4 2 The court concluded that the services were
not knowingly submitted in violation of the law because ambiguity existed in
how the services should be documented; the alleged low error rate demonstrated,
at most, inadvertent conduct or an honest mistake; 4 3 and the government's case

136. Id. During the 1990s, a criminal investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
the 01G, and Nevada's Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) placed the physician's Medicare and
Medicaid billings under intense scrutiny. Id. at 1023. "Despite this detailed review, the undisputed
evidence show[ed] that DOJ never questioned the simple stress test claims." Id. The DOJ withdrew its
intervention in the qui tam suit in 1995 "without receiving any payment as settlement [and] thereby
effectively acknowledging that its case lacked merit." Id.
137. Id. at 1031.
138. Id. at 1032.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1032.
143. Id. at 1034.
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"'made no economic sense"' because the physician lost money in providing the
pulmonary rehabilitation services.'44
4. Implications of False Claims Enforcement
Despite the dismissal of the false claims action against the physician in
Prabhu, the government's suit had a damaging effect: "[A]s a direct result of
this lawsuit, [the physician] ceased providing pulmonary rehabilitation to his
patients."''4 5 Thus, the "rare victory" ' for providers in Prabhu demonstrates that
even vindication by the courts does not mitigate the consequences of the
increasing complexity of the health care industry.
Absent the extraordinary facts under which the government alleged false
claims in Prabhu, uncertainty remains as to the circumstances under which a
provider would prevail in a suit based on false claims allegations. For example,
many courts have adopted the theory that government knowledge and approval
of a provider's conduct negates the scienter element of the FCA. 4 7 However, the
defense fails where the government does not have "full knowledge" of material
facts surrounding the conduct.' 48 For instance, in United States v. Chen,'49 a
provider argued the government knowledge defense based on Medicare's review
and approval of three claims for payment.'15 The court denied15 ' a motion to
reconsider its refusal to grant summary judgment 52 because the government
established a material issue of fact as to thirty-six similar claims filed subsequent
to the carrier's approval. 53 In addition, a material issue of fact was created as to
the government's knowledge because Medicare had relied on information
submitted by the provider in approving the previous three claims. 54 Therefore,

144. Id.at 1035. The physician "lost substantial money" by providing these services to his patients
but stated that he had provided the services because of the "substantial health benefit his patients
obtained." Id. at 1023.
145. Id.at 1023.
146. Amy Lynn Sorrel, Court Vndicates Nevada Doctorin Latest Twist ofFraudCase, AM. MED.
NEWS, Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/09/04/gvsbO904.htm
("Physicians are often forced to settle such disputes with the government, even when they believe they
are acting appropriately, because the financial stakes are so high.").
147. United States ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 289 (4th
Cir. 2002) (joining the 2nd. 7th, 9th, and 10th circuits in holding "that the government's knowledge of
the facts underlying an allegedly false record or statement can negate the scienter required for an FCA
violation").
148. United States ex rel Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 920 21
& n.14 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a contractor's "government knowledge" defense to the scienter
requirement of the FCA where the Department of Energy approved a subcontract based on less than
"full knowledge," but continued to pay invoices after becoming aware of the falsity of the certification).
149. No. 2:04-CV-00859-PMP-PAL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53329 (D. Nev. July 31, 2006).
150.Id. at *6-7.
151. Id. at *9.
152. Id.at*1.
153. Id.at*7.
154. Id. at*8.
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reliance upon a health plan's approval and payment does not immunize a
provider from false claims allegations and liability; it may only provide a
defense.
Because of the persisting confusion created by regulations, rules, and
standards, providers may continue to settle false claims allegations:
Compared to "bad actors" engaged "in raw fraud," legitimate
providers whose activities fall within a regulatory gray area
might well be more likely to fear the untoward effects of a
fraud suit, and hence more likely to settle. If so, this would
have the perverse effect of relieving the government of its
burden of proof in precisely those cases in which the protection
afforded by the intent requirement is most important. There is a
danger that such settlements will completely deter not "raw"
fraud, but rather the basic provision of health care services
where billing requirements are unclear-putting anti-fraud
enforcement in direct conflict with the goal of providing
necessary medical care to patients. 155
Furthermore, enforcement efforts such as those in Prabhu send a message to
providers that despite a provider's good faith efforts to comply, the government
may pursue false claims actions. It is unlikely that many providers could
withstand the scrutiny endured by the physician in Prabhuafter thirteen years of
efforts to comply with program requirements.
IV.

BALANCING THE BURDENS

The complexity of the health care industry, especially in the Medicaid
program, creates an increased risk of potential false claims allegations. In light
of the reimbursement and reporting issues presently creating a disincentive for
providers to continue caring for Medicaid patients, failure to minimize the
burdens imposed upon health care providers may adversely impact beneficiaries'
access to care. States that elect to enact false claims statutes should protect
against the potential decrease in Medicaid providers and beneficiaries' access to
care.
Guidance provided by the efforts of states, health care organizations, and
commentators suggests three measures that may mitigate the potential harmful
effects of Medicaid reform and false claims enforcement on provider
participation in the Medicaid program. Combined, these measures may
encourage healthcare providers to participate in the Medicaid program by
increasing financial certainty regarding Medicaid payments and protecting
providers from baseless false claims litigation.

155. Krause, supra note 11, at 208.
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First, South Carolina and other states should enact a law requiring the
disclosure of all billing and reimbursement information by health plans to health
care providers. This law should require health plans, including Medicaid health
plans, to disclose "what they pay and how they pay. 156 For example, Texas law
requires health maintenance organizations to provide, within thirty days of a
request, a "description and copy of the coding guidelines, including any
underlying bundling, recoding, or other payment process and fee schedules
applicable to specific procedures that the physician or provider will receive
under the contract. 157 Contracts must also require that providers receive
notification of changes in billing or coding policies at least ninety days before
they become effective, prohibit retroactive application of policies, and allow
providers to terminate the contract within thirty days of receiving notice of
changes.1 5 ' Not only should state law require the provision of payment policies
and fee schedules upon request by contracted providers, health plans should also
be required to supply these policies to providers contemplating contracting with
health plans.
The provision of payment policies to health care providers prior to
contracting and upon request would serve four fundamental purposes. First, the
provision of payment and coding policies would allow providers to assess the
financial costs of providing specific services to Medicaid patients. If policies
exist, providers should be supplied with this information prior to contracting;
providers should not discover after-the-fact that the services they intended to
provide are not financially feasible because of policies that reduce or eliminate
payment of specific services.
Second, contracts that include provisions requiring disclosure upon request
would prevent health plans from using these provisions as a negotiating strategy.
In particular, the disclosure requirements would protect small groups and solo
practitioners who may, individually, lack the Medicaid patient base to leverage
inclusion of these disclosure requirements. By requiring these provisions
through statute, providers may not feel compelled to decline Medicaid
participation in fear of discovering adverse payment policies.
Third, as noted by one court, disclosure of such information is necessary for
health care providers in determining the accuracy of payments and the
contractual obligations of health insurance plans. 159 Substantial time and

156. Am. Med. Ass'n. Testimony Before the National Conference ofInsurance Legislators Health
Insurance Meeting, Bringing Fairness and Transparency to Health Plan Payer Contracting and Payment
Processes 2 (July 8, 2005).
157. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 843.32 1(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2006).
158. § 843.32(a)(3) (4).
159. Med. Ass'n of Ga. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 536 S.E.2d 184, 186 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2000)
Without such fee information, there is no way for doctors to calculate for
themselves whether they have been fully paid for a particular service under the
plan. While the doctors agreed to abide by Blue Cross' rules and regulations, and
while they agreed to allow Blue Cross to make changes to the reimbursement plan
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resources could be wasted in determining if ambiguous or undisclosed
contractual obligations are being met; instead, those resources should be focused
on patient care.
Finally, in addition to increasing providers' certainty regarding payment,
supplying health care providers with this information would aid in the
prevention of inadvertent billing misrepresentations and failures to comply with
program requirements. Even with compliance programs and regular audits,
providers can do little to identify deviations from health plan policies if the
policies are not timely and fully disclosed to providers. The provision of policies
to providers would enable providers to identify and prevent "false" claims
before there is an allegation of falsity that may be based upon policies never
disclosed to health care providers.
Laws requiring the disclosure of more information to providers are
insufficient alone to counteract the potential impact upon Medicaid providers;
South Carolina should also enact measures to ensure that providers receive clear
information, not simply more information."'
In the absence of meaningful standards and useful guidance
from a payor, a physician is often presented with a choice
among the following unacceptable actions: assuming risk of
nonpayment if a payor deems the service not to be covered;
furnishing a service only if the patient provides a commitment
to pay if the service is not covered . . . ; or not furnishing or
recommending the service. 6 '
Even if a provider chooses to assume the risks of nonpayment in performing
a service, providers may not be as willing to assume the risk of payment; that is,
providers may choose not to perform a service at all in order to avoid false
claims allegations and the possibility of civil penalties and double or treble
damages. 6 2 Therefore, South Carolina should create an ombudsman office
within the state Medicaid agency that would allow providers to seek clarification
of program requirements without fear of liability. 16 3 Given the prevalence of
managed care within Medicaid, a state's ombudsman program should provide
guidance for both Medicaid and Medicaid managed care plans. Either in the
presence of a multitude of ambiguous polices or the lack of applicable policies,

rules, the doctors never agreed to allow Blue Cross to keep its fee schedules and
methods for determining fees secret. Such information is critical to the doctors so
that they can ensure that Blue Cross is fulfilling its obligations under the
contracts.
Id.
160. See Krause, supra note 111, at 213 (arguing that consistent and legitimate FCA enforcement
requires clarification of regulatory "'gray areas"').
161. Blanchard, szpra note 78, at 620 (footnote omitted).
162. See szpra text accompanying notes 106 110.
163. See AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, supra note 31, at 34.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 15

1022

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 995

fear of false claims liability should not force providers into withholding or
discontinuing services simply because they have been unable to obtain useful
clarifying guidance.
An ombudsman program would provide an avenue for providers to seek
advice and clarification while remaining anonymous. Because of anonymity,
more providers may be willing to come forward and address potential false
claims. More importantly, an ombudsman program would allow providers to
receive guidance to resolve ambiguity or issues not directly addressed by
Medicaid and Medicaid health plans. Given the variations between Medicaid
and each health plan's provisions, providers should not be required to wait for
false claims allegations in order to discern whether the government considers a
claim to be false. Both the federal and state false claims acts are inappropriate
tools for defining the falsity of claims. Settlements provide little guidance to
other providers, and the costs of false litigation, both monetary and in terms of
access to care, are too great to ignore the potential for resolution of the problem
by creating a voluntary program that provides guidance and clarification.
Finally, South Carolina's false claims statute should entitle providers "to an
affirmative defense in false claims cases in which they can establish their good
faith reliance" on the advice of a government program or health plan.' 64 While
many courts and commentators have asserted that the scienter requirement of the
FCA prevents convictions under the FCA for "honest mistakes,"'' 65 United States
v. Prabhu illustrates that providers may face false claims allegations for "honest
166
mistakes" in spite of good faith efforts to comply with program requirements.
There are rules that are really confusing and where doctors
can't get direction. And we've had [doctors who have] gone
through hell based on these kind of [FCA allegations], and I'd
just encourage a balance there. It's very hard to deal with.
You've got to get the bad guys, but there ought to be a process.
You need to be thinking about a process for deciding when a
case is not meritorious and then dropping it.' 6
States considering enacting a false claims statute should keep in mind that while
many provisions of the federal FCA must be included within the state statute in
order to qualify, the state law need not adopt all provisions of the FCA.

164. Jost & Davies, supra note 63. at 315.
165. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
166. United States v. Prabhu, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1030 (D. Nev. 2006).
167. Reauthorizationof the U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Officefor U.S.Attorneys, Civil
Division, Environment andNaturalResources Division, Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, andOffice
ofthe SolicitorGeneral: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Commercial andAdministrativeLaw of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 83 (2006) (statement of Rep. Chris Cannon, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law).
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Including affirmative defenses for good faith reliance upon the advice of health
plans and government knowledge reinforces the requisite "knowingly" scienter.
Of course, affirmative defenses for good faith reliance and government
knowledge will not completely prevent the negative consequences of false
claims allegations themselves. For example, false claims allegations will
probably affect providers' reputations, and providers will incur legal costs in
responding to the allegations; however, these affirmative defenses, if successful,
would allow a provider to more quickly dispose of a false claims action. These
defenses may be particularly useful in defending against qui tam actions that
have continued despite government refusal to intervene. Because qui tam
plaintiffs have a significant monetary incentive to bring false claims actions and
may not be aware of providers' efforts to comply, providers should be allowed
to respond with the government's own advice and awareness to defeat these
actions. In addition, these cases may provide an incentive for the state
government to elect not to intervene in a qui tam action, or, one would hope, to
seek dismissal of the qui tam action.
Providing an affirmative defense for providers who rely upon the advice of
government programs or health plans would supply providers with the assurance
necessary to avoid settling claims and prevent prosecutors from pursuing
meritless claims based solely upon ambiguous regulations, rules, or standards
and the opinion of an "expert."
V. CONCLUSION

Medicaid reform efforts combined with increased focus on fraud and abuse
in the Medicaid program seek to reduce the costs of the Medicaid program. False
claims allegations and prosecutions may adversely affect Medicaid
beneficiaries' access to care by pressuring providers to refuse to participate in
the Medicaid program. To counteract the cumulative effect of false claims
enforcement in a complex health care industry, South Carolina and other states
should develop measures to encourage open communication between Medicaid
health plans and providers, provide clarification of ambiguous regulations and
guidance, and protect Medicaid providers that are making good faith efforts to
comply with program requirements.
Christine M. Shaffer
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